Locke—on the transition from state of nature to civil society and politics
(see Aristotle comparison overhead)
We have seen how Locke’s conception of a natural right to private property as analysed in its historical development, leads to a class society based on those who own much, and those who own only their own capacity for labour. We have seen also that the peculiarly modern and Protestant conception of existence that Locke bases his political philosophy on necessarily enters into antagonism with those others who do not fit into this worldview (such as aboriginal peoples and African tribes), and whom Locke does not recognize as legitimate (since he believes his own worldview to be based on the universal and rational laws of reason). In light of this we can now understand why the state of nature in Locke, which is governed by moral reason, necessarily breaks down and requires the institution of a political society and a mode of government.
If people are moral, and they can execute the laws of nature themselves, why would it be necessary to create a political community at all? Why couldn’t we live in a state of anarchy? Locke talks variously of “the inconveniences” of the state of nature “and the love and want of society” (s. 101). But in ch. 9 “the ends of political society” who goes further to suggest that of all the natural freedoms and rights we have in the s. of nature “the enjoyment of it [such right] is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others” (s.123). Furthermore, he speaks of human beings as “the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice” (123), of mankind as “being but in an ill condition” (s.127), and of “the corruption and vitiousness of degenerate men” (s.128). And thus “the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure” (123). The state “is full of fears and continual dangers”… (s.124).
Some commentators speak of the 2 different versions of the state of nature in Locke, that given in chapter 2 and that in chapter 9, seeing chapter 9 as the one that Locke is really serious about. But really we are dealing with 2 different historical periods here. Since a Lockean society leads to expansion and to multiplication of needs and desires, it will inevitably encounter cultural “others” in the sense noted above, and since it leads over time to a class-divided society, it makes sense that the “state of nature” over time will become a much more conflicted one. From Locke’s perspective the society will encounter others who behave like wild animals who have lost their moral reason and fallen out of the moral community. From the perspective of the others, they will encounter expansionist Lockean settlers who lay unjust claim to land that is not available to them, and who do not recognize the autonomy of other cultural/political communities. Within the Lockean society itself, it will encounter (eventually—although not in Locke’s time), “others” who do not necessarily operate according to the Lockean paradigm and who become a potential threat to the stability of the social order—as we have had in the 19th and 20th century working class movements, and the first and second wave of the feminist movements.
Hence Locke’s society is fraught with others who may be hostile to the orientations of property-seeking, driven individuals. Eventually these propertied individuals will be forced to defend themselves from the others and it is for this reason that the political community is created. Its chief end is the preservation of the property of these individuals (s.124). It is these individuals who form the community and the government to preserve their interests and orientations. Just as the original pre-political moral community turns out to be peculiar to a certain group, so the political community that is formed to preserve that moral community turns out to be particular and exclusive. The property-owners form a political community to collectively preserve their individual private properties from hostile outsiders (and potentially hostile insiders), as well as to regulate their conduct more clearly amongst themselves.
Stages—difference between forming a community and forming a government
The first stage into a political community is not to choose a government but to form oneself into a body politic (chap. 8) or “political society” (87) or “civil society” (87) “common-wealth” (s.133). “make themselves into one body with a power to act as one body”. This body operates by majority consent (s.95-99) in the second stage, the forming of a government. But originally to form a body politic (a political community of private-property holders) requires the consent of every member of the community, and this must be an express consent, not a tacit one. (like a citizenship declaration). By this they turn themselves from a multitude of separate individuals into a cohesive community that can act with one will, according to majority vote. (“a power to act as one body” (s.96))
s.95. “The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of it” (my emphasis).
So individuals agree to be governed by majority vote. Give up all power necessary to the ends for which the community is set up, to the majority of the community.
Tacit consent
If do not give express consent, then might live passively under the laws of that community but not be a member of it. Can’t be a “citizen” of it in the sense of taking an active part in its political affairs. (s. 119,122). This doctrine of tacit consent is significant in Locke given the existence of the working class and women. Tacit consent does not just apply to foreigners passing through, as he implies, but to all those disenfranchised members of the community, those who do not fit into the Lockean framework in one way or another but who neverthless are conditions of the functioning of the community. By tacit consent they are obliged to “obedience to the laws of that government…whether his possession be of land…or a lodging only for a week”(s. 119) my emphasis. As long as one “enjoys” the privileges and protections of the society, one must submit to its administration. Tacit consent is a central doctrine in a society where there are so many internal others, or where new others will be brought into the society, as with Natives and so on, who will not give express consent or who are not really given the opportunity to do so.
The movement out of s. of n. into political community is a significant one—from state of nature into political community (prior to establishment of govt)—because of its permanent character, and because it is governed by majority vote. It is key to Locke’s doctrine of limited government because it allows one to change the legislative (the formal place of government), while not devolving all the way back to the state of nature (see. S.225-26—the difference between revolution and “rebellion”). [it is furthermore notable that this intermediary stage between s. of n. and govt. does not exist in Hobbes alongside the absence of a right of revolution]. While it may be possible to change a government, one cannot get so easily out of the community of private property holders to whom one is now beholden and subject. If the government oversteps its boundaries and gets rejected by the community, one does not go back to the state of nature. One goes back to this community who will then choose a new government. One is “perpetually and indispensibly obliged to be, and remain unalterably subject to it, and can never be again in the liberty of the state of nature” (s121, see also s.243).
However, in being part of the community one is not yet under government. That is the second stage. The community which now acts as one body politic under the direction of the majority, must choose where to situate the legislative power. Legislative power is defined as “That, which has a right to direct how the force of the common-wealth shall be employed for preserving the community and the members of it” (143). First act of the majority is to establish wherein the legislative power of the community will lie. This is the “supreme authority” in the sense that it is the only power which can make laws to which we are all subject and we owe our obedience to those laws. It is “sacred and unalterable” once established (s.134). (but can be changed in extreme cases by revolution)
Determines the “form” of the community
-a democracy—legislative power rests in the hands of the community as a whole
-oligarchy—lies in hands of a few select men and their heirs or successors (significant in its difference from Aristotle—not seen as rule of wealthy and not distinguished from aristocracy—indicates that this is a society based on wealth accumulation and so no need to distinguish between the rule of the wealthy and the rule of the best)
-monarchy—in the hands of one man
-mixed forms—temporarily place power in one body and then reverts again to people to decide where to place it. (our system of representative democracy I think would fit here)
In spite of it being a “supreme authority” it is a limited authority and here is where we find Locke’s doctrine of limited govt. and his historical significance in relationship to Hobbes. The following specific limits:
1. sovereign subject to the laws of nature and must make laws in accordance with these (vs. Hobbes—prudential advice). The point of civil society is the preservation of property; it is the basis of our joining together. The power of the legislature is thus not arbitary (pp. 70-71). The sovereign takes over from individuals the carrying out of the law of nature (preservation of self and others). Since in the state of nature we don’t have arbitrary power over ourselves—can’t harm others or commit suicide—so government cannot have arbitrary power—can’t harm others or take away their life or property (with the exception of those who attack you or the state). It is impossible for members to create an arbitrary power. The purpose of laws of nature is to enable private property and thereby self-preservation. So the law-maker also has this as its purpose. If the legislature goes beyond this then individuals have “an appeal to heaven”. The legislature “can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects” (71). (right of revolution rests in this higher laws—right to oppose—“appeal to heaven”. But revolution only happens if majority are abused in an ongoing manner. (see below on Locke’s rejection of politics)
2. must rule by promulgated standing laws (rule of law). Different from Hobbes—sovereign above the law and not part of the contract. If sovereign acts against the law, can hold him to account. This is one of the conditions on giving up power to the sovereign. Otherwise citizens would be in a state of nature in relationship to the legislature and executive, but the whole point of the contract was to get out of a state of nature. Also this rule of law avoids revolution, or having to change the legislature, because it is a way of settling disputes between citizens and sovereigns in a peaceful way. Seems however to presuppose an independent judiciary (“known, authorized judges”) although Locke does not mention this as a separate power alongside executive and legislative. Laws also clarify things for citizens and thus keep peace amongst them.
3. Can’t take away any part of a man’s property without his consent (eg. Taxes. This is because the preservation of property is the end of govt. Consent here equals consent of the majority, or their representatives chosen by them.
4. Legislature can’t transfer power of law-making to another body. Power is derived from the people and they hold it on trust
5. Separation of executive and legislative powers (less likely to abuse power and not necessary for legislative always to be sitting)
Overall govt is contrained on all sides by the higher natural law. If govt oversteps its bounds and individuals cannot find redress from within, then they can “appeal to heaven”. If a majority find themselves in this situation and find it serious enough then they are warranted in rejecting the existing legislature and taking power back into the hands of the community and investing it again in a new legislature. There is no going back to a state of nature.
The significance of the doctrine of limited government for the Lockean political society
Historically Locke’s theory of limited govt. constitutes his greatest influence in political thought, in spite of more critical interpretations of him. He is seen to constitute a real alternative to the idea of the Hobbesian absolute sovereign.
But beyond this historical importance what we can more generally say about the doctrine of limited government and the nature of the business of government in Locke’s thought is what kind of society it indicates. For it shows overall the extreme lack of interest in politics as a distinct activity. The whole point of creating society and government is to divest oneself of the political power one has in the state of nature—the power to know, interpret, and apply the laws of nature (s. 71). The first act of the political society is to create a legislature and thereby to get rid of political power as something held in their hands. The problem with this power is not just that it has its various ambiguities and leads to conflicts, but that it is burdensome and dangerous to have it in one’s own hands, and the conflicts involved in it remaining at the individual level will interfere with the pursuit of property. The whole point is to get rid of this power, to delegate it first to the community and then have the community delegate it to a body of individuals to do the work of politics for them—to make the laws known (write them down), to interpret the laws, and to apply the laws so that one doesn’t have the danger of doing so oneself.
The fact is that the real business of life here is one’s own private existence, the business of working hard and generating wealth and of being interfered with as little as possible in doing this. Government’s job is to facilitate this.
Locke says so very explicitly when he says that the purpose of politics is the preservation of property. It stands outside of the real business of life and is subservient thereto. It is purely instrumental to private accumulation.
He furthermore speaks of the purpose of politics as that of “umpire” (s.212, and ?). It only comes into play when we happen to clash in our private activities. I.e. govt. is not about democracy in the sense of self-government, it is not about sharing in a common set of values (Aristotle)—although it presupposes a common set of values. It is about mediating our private lives, about preventing war. Hence we can see also how Locke’s philosophy represents a dominant understanding of politics in the society of today.
The lack of interest in politics as a specific mode of activity is also indicated in Locke’s statements about the power of the people to appeal outside government to “heaven” in cases of injustice. S.177 if one’s rights to one’s property or that of one’s ancestors has been denied, and one wants to seek redress, one had better be sure that it “is worth the trouble and cost of the appeal”. One should not trouble one’s neighbour without a cause.
S.225. he goes on in the same vein regarding the power of the society to change the legislature is it oversteps its bounds. This would not be done lightly because it is so much trouble for the people. Only “if a long train of abuses, prevarications and artifices, all tending the same way, make the design visible to the people, and they cannot but feel what they lie under, and see whither they are going; it is not to be wondered, that they should then rouse themselves, and endeavour to put the rule into such hands which may secure to them the ends for which government was at first erected” (s.225).
The idea that govt. is held on “trust” is a further indication of this divestment of the activity of politics. We put these powers in the hands of the legislative so that they can do the work for us and we trust them to do it for the purposes for which it is created. We do this because we do not want to do it. We pay them to do this dirty business for us. But if they go against these purposes and start to use it for their own interests, then we can take it back again and give it to a more responsible party.
The only major political actions that are undertaken by the political community as a whole include: 1) to decide where the legislative power will rest (as a monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy) (13?). 2) To effectively decide whether the govt. is overstepping its bounds and whether it should be deposed and replaced is the decision of the majority (s.168). [hence to give power away, and then to take it back when necessary in extreme cases and immediately to divest oneself of it again in a new legislature]. and 3) to decide whether taxation or any taking of a part of one’s property is acceptable (s.140). This is the extent of one’s actual participation in politics in most cases. (except for those who engage in politics as a career or a calling and in this case they get their own private rewards for so doing. The Aristotelian idea of politics as the higher end for human beings per se is definitively rejected here)
But this raises another issue. Even these limited political actions by the society as a whole are determined not by individuals per se but by the majority. If my vote goes against that of the majority in terms of where to invest the legislative power, whether the existing legislature is corrupt and should be overthrown and replaced, or whether we should have this system of taxation, or the right to expropriate property etc., then my vote loses out. These political decisions are the decisions of the majority of the community. Why is Locke not then worried about the tyranny of the majority?
Answer: This is a fairly homogenous community of property-owners who have expressly consented to be part of this community and hence who share the same value system and orientation and interests. There is a harmony of interest or a class interest going on, and hence one does not have to worry that the decisions of “the people” who make up this community will be radically opposed to one’s own interests. One can more or less trust this community not to decide anything too radical. Locke’s main concern at this historical juncture is not to protect the individual from the community, but to protect the community of property holders from a rapacious government.
But secondly, majority rule is quick and efficient—no debates and deliberations and creation of consensus. The point is to delegate the power in an efficient way and this also speaks to his lack of interest in politics. Voting is not politics in a larger sense of the term, as in the Greek sense of deliberation. Furthermore, the majority will ensure a fair degree of stability on the question of revolution because it is only if the majority are abused and disillusioned that a revolution will happen. Revolution is to be avoided as much as possible because it is so disruptive to the real business of living.
